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INTRODUCTION

In his dissent to Strickland v. Washington,2 Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote
that "the right to effective assistance of counsel is entailed by the right to
counsel, and abridgement of the former is equivalent to abridgment of the
latter." 3 While Justice Marshall thought that his colleagues did not venture far
enough in securing the rights of those being prosecuted by the government,4 the
majority in Strickland held that all state criminal defendants across the nation are
guaranteed the right to "reasonably effective assistance" under the Sixth
Amendment and formulated a standard judging this effectiveness.'
The Strickland standard is a two-pronged test that reviews whether defense
counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether that deficiency
prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial. 6 Thirty years after this landmark
decision, however, a number of differing interpretations exist among the state

1.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984).
2.
466 U.S. 668.
3.
Id. at 711-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
4.
See id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("For the most part, the majority's efforts are
unhelpful. Neither of its two principal holdings seems to me likely to improve the adjudication of
Sixth Amendment claims.").
5. Id. at 687-88 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 768, 770, 771 (1970)); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.").
6.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
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and federal courts concerning the Strickland standard. Some courts apply the
test to each claim of ineffective counsel individually.8 Other courts question
whether an accumulation of multiple nondeficient errors can result in deficient
performance or whether multiple deficiencies-each alone failing to cause
prejudice under the test-in their totality inhibited the defendant's right to a fair
result.9 Thus, the "lack of uniformity" among the nation's courts on how to
properly test claims of ineffective counsel "lead[s] to truly anomalous,
inconsistent, and unfair results."10
To illustrate the inherent unfairness of multiple Strickland standards, a
defendant in Virginia-a state that only recognizes an individualized approach to
evaluating claims-faces a higher burden of proving ineffective counsel under
Strickland than would a defendant right across the border in Maryland, a state
that adheres to cumulative prejudice analysis.
The higher burden for
individualized review exists even when the defendants' respective attorneys may
have acted in exactly the same manner and committed the same errors at trial.
Demonstrating an equivalent tension between state and federal courts concerning
the Strickland test, a defendant's claims of ineffective counsel in the West
Virginia state court system would receive a cumulative analysis, while the same
claims in a habeas corpus petition to the United States District Court for the
District of West Virginia would only be reviewed individually. 13
One of the fundamental goals of the American justice system is that
"[c]riminal defendants' constitutional rights should not vary by the happenstance
of their location."1 4 The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel is too important to defendants facing prosecution to have such diverging

7.
See id.; Brief of the Nat'1 Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Marcrum v. Roper, 509 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 07-1566), cert. denied, 555 U.S.
1068 (2008), at 7.
8.
See, e.g., Teleguz v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 688 S.E.2d 865, 879 (Va. 2010)
("Having rejected each of petitioner's individual claims, there is no support for the proposition that
such actions when considered collectively have deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel." (quoting Lenz v. Warden of Sussex I State Prison, 593 S.E.2d 292,
305 (Va. 2004))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
9.
See, e.g., Cirincione v. State, 705 A.2d 96, 113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) ("[N]umerous
non-deficient errors may cumulatively amount to a deficiency, . . .or numerous non-prejudicial
deficiencies may cumulatively cause prejudice." (citing Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438-39
(9th Cir. 1995); Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d 734, 744 (Md. 1990))).
10. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 7, at 7.
11. See id. at 8; see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (showing interpretations of
cumulative review by Virginia and Maryland).
12. See Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 7, at 8.
13. See id.; see also Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852-53 (4th Cir. 1998) (reviewing
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel individually); State ex rel. Daniel v. Legursky, 465
S.E.2d 416, 424 n.7 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.
1995)) (reviewing the cumulative effect of multiple counsel errors).
14. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 7, at 8.
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interpretations among various federal and state jurisdictions.
Indeed, Justice
Marshall's prediction to the majority in Strickland in which he correctly
warned that the majority's performance standard was "so malleable that, in
practice, it will ... yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth
Amendment is interpreted and applied by different courts" 6 has manifested
itself thirty years later.1 The Supreme Court has yet to review the question of
whether courts should assess claims of ineffective counsel individually or
cumulatively." Like the Supreme Court, the South Carolina judiciary has yet to
decide whether cumulative analysis is appropriate. 19 Nevertheless, until the
Supreme Court clarifies this fundamental constitutional question, South Carolina
courts should err on the side of the expansive view of the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee of assistance of counsel by employing cumulative prejudice analysis
for multiple claims of ineffective counsel.
This Note argues that the South Carolina judiciary should adopt cumulative
prejudice analysis to ensure fair and consistent reviews of Strickland ineffective
counsel claims in post-conviction relief (PCR) applications. Part II explains the
landmark cases of Strickland v. Washington20 and United States v. Cronic.21 Part
III discusses the jurisdictional split among the state and federal courts
concerning cumulative analysis.
Part IV.A emphasizes that Strickland's
language supports a cumulative approach to ineffective counsel claims, and Part
IV.B highlights other Supreme Court precedent approving of cumulative
analysis. Part V examines the current landscape of cumulative analysis in South
Carolina jurisprudence.
Finally, Part VI concludes by surveying policy
objectives supporting the adoption of cumulative analysis in Strickland reviews
in South Carolina.

15. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) ("[The assistance of counsel]
is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty." (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938))) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
16. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 707 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall also disapproved of the prejudice prong entirely and believed that a criminal defendant
sufficiently demonstrates a Sixth Amendment violation simply by proving that counsel's
performance was constitutionally deficient. See id. at 710-12 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 23 n.8 (1967)).
17. See Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 7, at 8.
18. See, e.g., Marcrum v. Luebbers, 509 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 555 U.S.
1068 (2008) (denying the petition for certiorari).
19. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 397 S.C. 226, 243 n.5, 723 S.E.2d 610, 617 n.5 (Ct. App. 2012)
("[W]hether the cumulation of several errors, 'which by themselves are not prejudicial, would
warrant relief is an unsettled question in South Carolina." (quoting Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521,
535 n.3, 657 S.E.2d 771, 779 n.3 (2008))) (internal quotation marks omitted). Cumulative analysis
for ineffective counsel claims also appears to be an unsettled question in Missouri and North
Dakota. See Midgyett v. State, 392 S.W.3d 8, 18 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting State v. Gray, 887
S.W.2d 369, 390 (Mo. 1994)); Garcia v. State, 678 N.W.2d 568, 578 (N.D. 2004).
20. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
21. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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II. STRICKLAND AND CRONIC
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the fundamental importance of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in state felony prosecutions in Gideon v.
Wainwright.22 In Gideon, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
assistance of counsel for indigent defendants-at the time only guaranteed to
indigent defendants in federal courts 23was incorporated through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, therefore, applicable to
indigent defendants in state prosecutions.24 After a "variety of standards"
developed among the state and federal courts regarding the quality of
performance by defense counsel in the two decades following Gideon,25 the
Court issued two landmark companion opinions on the subject on May 14,
1984.26

In Strickland v. Washington, the Court confirmed that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees defendants the right to "reasonably effective assistance."27 In
Strickland, a Florida death row inmate petitioned the Court, claiming his
appointed counsel was ineffective in six separate instances after pleading guilty
to three capital murder charges and waiving his right to an advisory jury at his
capital sentencing hearing against his counsel's advice.28 The petitioner argued,
among other things, that his trial counsel was ineffective during the sentencing
hearing because his counsel failed to move for a continuance, failed to request a
psychiatric report, and failed to investigate and present character witnesses.29
In an attempt to establish a standard for evaluating defense counsel
performance for the first time,30 the Strickland Court adopted a two-pronged test
that a defendant must satisfy to prove ineffective counsel and, consequently, a
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.31 First, the defendant must

22. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
23. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (quoting Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 308 (1930)) (holding that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of
counsel to indigent federal criminal defendants).
24. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942);
Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69). In Gideon, the Court overruled Betts v. Brady, which held that the
Sixth Amendment was not incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Betts, 316 U.S. at 468, rev'd, Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45.
25. John H. Blume & Christopher Seeds, Reliability Matters: Reassociating Bagley
Materiality,StricklandPrejudice, and Cumulative Harmless Error, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1153, 1165 (2005).
26. See Cronic, 466 U.S. 648; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
27. Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
28. Id. at 672, 675. The defendant also pleaded guilty to "multiple counts of robbery,
kidnapping for ransom, breaking and entering and assault, attempted murder, and conspiracy to
commit robbery." Id. at 672.
29. Id. at 675.
30. See id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The state and lower federal courts have
developed standards for distinguishing effective from inadequate assistance. Today, for the first
time, this Court attempts to synthesize and clarify those standards.") (footnote omitted).
31. See id. at 687.
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demonstrate that defense counsel's "performance was deficient."32
The
defendant can establish deficient performance by proving that counsel made
"errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."33 The Court held that the proper
standard for judging counsel's conduct is "simply reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms." 34 Second, the defendant must prove the
infliction of prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance. 35 To satisfy the
prejudice prong, the defendant must prove that counsel's deficiency was so
serious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial or result. 36 Applying the test
to the facts of the case, the Strickland Court concluded that there was a "double
failure" because the petitioner could not show evidence of deficient performance
by counsel or any indication that he suffered prejudice.37
In United States v. Cronic, however, the Court recognized some rare cases in
which a court could presume prejudice from several circumstances surrounding
inadequate representation. 38 In Cronic, the respondent was convicted on mail
fraud indictments for his participation, along with two accomplices, in a "check
kiting scheme" involving the transfer of millions of dollars.
The trial court
appointed a young real estate attorney to represent the defendant in that case.40
Prior to trial, defense counsel was given only twenty-five days for preparation,
while federal prosecutors had been investigating and preparing for the case for
over four years.41 The Tenth Circuit reversed the respondent's conviction.42
Specifically, the circuit court held that the respondent was not required to prove
trial counsel error or prejudice because "no such showing is necessary 'when
circumstances hamper a given lawyer's preparation of a defendant's case.'"43
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that this case
was not one of the very few instances in which counsel's performance resulted in
per se prejudice, thus rendering unnecessary any further inquiry into prejudice. 44
The Court elaborated on three presumed instances of ineffectiveness, stating that
prejudice is first presumed if a defendant is denied assistance at a "critical stage"

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 688. The Court commented that, while no definitive checklist for accepted
professional practices exists, standards such as the American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice could perhaps serve as useful guides. Id. at 688-89.
35. Id. at 687.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 700.
38. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984).
39. Id. at 649-650.
40. Id. at 649.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 650 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 1982)).
44. See id. at 658, 666-67.
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of trial.45 Second, prejudice is presumed if "counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution's case to a meaningful adversarial testing." 46 In the third instance,
per se prejudice results when the "likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption
of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial."4
While the respondent's claim of ineffective counsel in Cronic did not fall into
any of these three scenarios, the Court remanded the case to allow the respondent
to point out counsel's specific errors so that the court of appeals could evaluate
them under the Strickland standard.48
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF STRICKLAND

State courts have diverged in their interpretations of the two-pronged
Strickland test for ineffective counsel claims in the thirty years following the
seminal cases discussed above. 49 A small minority of states has explicitly held
that courts must apply the Strickland test on each claim of ineffective counsel
individually.5 0 Thus, in these jurisdictions, courts conclude that defense counsel
provided constitutionally inadequate assistance only when at least one claim of
51
counsel error satisfies the two-pronged test on its own. Conversely, courts in a
majority of states have either recognized or plainly adopted some form of
cumulative analysis for reviewing ineffective counsel claims.52

45. Id. at 659-60 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45 (1932)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 659-60.
48. See id. at 666-67 & n.41 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693-96 (1984)).
49. Compare Schofield v. Holsey, 642 S.E.2d 56, 60 n.1 (Ga. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687) (approving cumulative analysis of multiple deficiencies), with Teleguz v. Warden of
Sussex I State Prison, 688 S.E.2d 865, 879 (Va. 2010) (quoting Lenz v. Warden of the Sussex I
State Prison, 593 S.E.2d 292, 305 (Va. 2004)) (rejecting cumulative analysis).
50. See Robertson v. State, 367 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Ark. 2010) (citing Echols v. State, 127
S.W.3d 486, 500 (Ark. 2003); Huddleston v. State, 5 S.W.3d 46, 50 (Ark. 1999)); Diaz v. Comm'r
of Corr., 6 A.3d 213, 222-23 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010); Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 684 (Fla.
2010) (citing Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008)); State v. Draughn, 950 So. 2d 583,
629 (La. 2007) (citing State v. Copeland, 530 So. 2d 526, 544-45 (La. 1988)); Simmons v. State,
869 So. 2d 995, 1005 (Miss. 2004); Teleguz, 688 S.E.2d at 879 (quoting Lenz, 593 S.E.2d at 305).
51. See, e.g., Robertson, 367 S.W.3d at 542 ("Where, as in the case before us, a convicted
defendant alleges many instances of ineffective assistance of counsel, at least one error standing
alone must meet the standard of Strickland for the defendant to be successfil.").
52. See Brooks v. State, 929 So. 2d 491, 514 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); State v. Savo, 108 P.3d
903, 916 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005); In re Jones, 917 P.2d 1175, 1196 (Cal. 1996); People v. Gandiaga,
70 P.3d 523, 528-29 (Colo. App. 2002); Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 790-91 (Del. 2013) (citing
Turner v. State, 5 A.3d 612, 615 (Del. 2010); Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 764 (Del. 1987); State
v. Savage, 2002 WL 187510, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002)); Schofield, 642 S.E.2d at 60 n.1 (citing
Strickland, 446 U.S. at 687); State v. Lovelass, 983 P.2d 233, 244 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (citing
State v. Hawkins, 958 P.2d 22, 33 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998); State v. Medina, 909 P.2d 637, 647 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1996)); People v. Foster, 660 N.E.2d 951, 962 (Ill. 1995); Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d
1027, 1036 37 (Ind. 2006) (citing Smith v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1042, 1046 (Ind. 1987)); State v.
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Although some slight variation exists among these state courts, cumulative
analysis generally entails the consideration of multiple claims of trial counsel
errors through either the deficient performance or prejudice prong of the
Strickland test.5 Some courts have concluded that, while specific types of error
by counsel may not amount to deficiencies under Strickland, the "fundamental
lack of formulation and direction in presenting a coherent defense" can establish
deficient performance under the first prong.54 Many courts have questioned
whether multiple counsel deficiencies, each failing individually under the
prejudice prong of the Strickland test, nonetheless violated the defendant's right
to a fair trial when viewed in a cumulative manner.
Additionally, the majority of federal circuits employ cumulative analysis in
their review of habeas corpus petitions from state court defendants alleging
violations of federally protected constitutional rights, such as the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel.56 The Fourth Circuit has openly

Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Iowa 2012); Thompson v. State, 270 P.3d 1089, 1101 (Kan. 2011)
(quoting State v. Ellmaker, 221 P.3d 1105, 1121 (Kan. 2009)); Marquez v. Commonwealth, No.
2003-CA-001431-MR, 2005 WL 195188, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2005); Cirincione v. State,
705 A.2d 96, 112-13 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (citing Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 39
(9th Cir. 1995); Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d 734, 744 (Md. 1990)); Commonwealth v. Smith, 924
N.E.2d 270, 280 (Mass. 2010); State v. Achaw, No. CX-01-604, 2001 WL 1646560, at *5, *6
(Minn. Dec. 26, 2001); State v. Hagen, 53 P.3d 885, 896-97 (Mont. 2002); McConnell v. State, 212
P.3d 307, 318 & n.17 (Nev. 2009); State v. Trujillo, 42 P.3d 814, 831 (N.M. 2002) (citing State v.
Richardson, 845 P.2d 819, 821 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992)); People v. Brown, 752 N.Y.S.2d 347, 349
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002); State v. Gondor, 860 N.E.2d 77, 90 (Ohio 2006) (citing Strickland,466 U.S.
at 695-96; State v. DeMarco, 509 N.E.2d 1256, 1261 (Ohio 1987)); Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30
A.3d 426, 483 (Pa. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009);
Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 952 A.2d 640, 671 (Pa. 2008)); McDowell v. Solem, 447 N.W.2d
646, 651 (S.D. 1989); State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); Ex
parte Aguilar, No. AP-75526, 2007 WL 3208751, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 31, 2007) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-96); State v. Lewis, 233 P.3d 891, 899 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
State v. Hodges, 77 P.3d 375, 378 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003)); State ex rel. Daniel v. Legursky, 465
S.E.2d 416, 424 n.7 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir.
1995)); State v. Thiel, 665 N.W.2d 305, 321-22 (Wis. 2003); Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 612
(Wyo. 1992) (citing Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo. 1987)).
53. See, e.g., Cirincione, 705 A.2d at 113 ("[N]umerous non-deficient errors may
cumulatively amount to a deficiency,... or numerous non-prejudicial deficiencies may
cumulatively cause prejudice." (citing Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1995);
Bowers v. State, 578 A.2d 734, 744 (Md. 1990))).
54. Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1162-65 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting and citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 690; Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 1993)).
55. See, e.g., Savo, 108 P.3d at 916 ("But the doctrine of cumulative error is really a doctrine
of cumulative prejudice. It applies only when real errors have been identified and the remaining
question is whether these errors, in combination, were so prejudicial as to undermine the
trustworthiness of the underlying judgment (even though each error, taken individually, might not
require reversal).").
56. Compare Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Strickland clearly allows
the court to consider the cumulative effect of counsel's errors in determining whether a defendant
was prejudiced." (quoting Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d 351, 370 (7th Cir. 1989))) (internal quotation
marks omitted), Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586, 619 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding prejudice based on
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Within the Fourth Circuit, however, state
disapproved of this analysis.
appellate courts in Maryland and West Virginia have subscribed to cumulative
analysis in their assessment of Strickland claims, while the Virginia Supreme
Court has followed the Fourth Circuit's analysis.59

the cumulation of multiple failures by counsel), Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1162-65
(10th Cir. 1999) ("[Clumulatively, each failure underscores a fundamental lack of formulation and
direction in presenting a coherent defense."), Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438-39 (9th Cir.
1995) ("[T]he plethora and gravity of [counsel's] deficiencies rendered the proceeding
fundamentally unfair." (citing Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 622, 624-25 (9th Cir.
1992))), Rodriguez v. Hoke, 928 F.2d 534, 538 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The state courts should have been
given the opportunity to consider all the circumstances and the cumulative effect of all the claims as
a whole." (quoting Grady v. LeFevre, 846 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1988))) (internal quotation marks
omitted), McNeil v. Cuyler, 782 F.2d 443, 451 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[A] verdict or conclusion only
weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with
overwhelming support." (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984))) (internal
quotation marks omitted), and Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th Cir. 1978))
("[P]rejudice may result from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies"), with Seymour v.
Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 557 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Because the individual claims of ineffectiveness
alleged by [petitioner] are all essentially meritless, [petitioner] cannot show that the cumulative
error of her counsel rendered him ineffective."), Fisher v. Angelone, 163 F.3d 835, 852 (4th Cir.
1998) (holding that claims of ineffective counsel must be reviewed individually rather than
collectively), and Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Wharton-El
v. Nix, 38 F.3d 372, 375 (8th Cir. 1994); Griffin v. Delo, 33 F.3d 895, 903-04 (8th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 917-18 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Errors that are not unconstitutional
individually cannot be added together to create a constitutional violation.")). The Eleventh Circuit
does not employ a cumulative error analysis, unless the defendant demonstrates that the trial in state
court was fundamentally unfair. See Pope v. Sec. for the Dep't of Corr., 680 F.3d 1271, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1386 (11th Cir. 1997)). For a detailed
discussion of cumulative analysis in federal habeas corpus petitions, see generally Ruth A. Moyer,
To Err is Human; To Cumulate, Judicious: The Need for U.S. Supreme Court Guidance on Whether
Federal Habeas Courts Reviewing State Convictions May Cumulatively Assess Strickland
Errors,61 DRAKE L. REv. 447, 466-74 (2013) (citations omitted).
57. See Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852 ("To the extent this Court has not specifically stated that
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, like claims of trial court error, must be reviewed
individually, rather than collectively, we do so now."). But see Moyer, supra note 56, at 468-69
(citing Fisher, 163 F.3d at 852) (highlighting some ambiguity in Fisher that suggests the court may
adopt "cumulative analysis in order to establish prejudice for ineffectiveness claims").
58. See Cirincione, 705 A.2d at 112-13 ("Even when no single aspect of the representation
falls below the minimum standards required under the Sixth Amendment, the cumulative effect of
counsel's entire performance may still result in a denial of effective assistance."); State ex rel.
Daniel v. Legursky, 465 S.E.2d 416, 424 n.7 (W. Va. 1995) ("In making the requisite showing of
prejudice, a petitioner may demonstrate that the cumulative effect of counsel's individual acts or
omissions was substantial enough to meet Strickland's test." (quoting Williams v. Washington, 59
F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 1995))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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IV. CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

A.

Strickland'sLanguage Supports a Cumulative Review

The language of the Strickland opinion suggests that the Supreme Court
anticipated that appeals would involve multiple claims of deficiency by counsel
and that courts should review the resulting prejudice cumulatively. 60 In the
deficiency prong of the two-part test, the Court specifically focused on defense
counsel's "performance."61 As Professor Blume and Christopher Seeds argue,
the "cumulation [of deficiencies] begins in the first prong." 62 Additionally, the
Court elaborated on the overall performance of counsel during representation,
holding that a defendant proves deficient performance by showing that "counsel
made errors so serious" that the defendant was deprived of the constitutionally
adequate representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.63
A similar choice of words is present in the prejudice prong of the Strickland
64
test.
The Court noted that the "defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense."6' Further, the Court explained that the
second prong is satisfied when the defendant proves that "counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is
reliable."66 Lower courts have particularly looked to the use of this language and
the plural use of "errors" to find that each individual counsel error should not be
reviewed in a vacuum.67 Indeed, one could only reasonably discern a directive
from the Court for a separate, individual review of each claim of deficient
performance under Strickland if the majority had chosen singular words such as
68
counsel's error or action.
Along with using the plural form throughout its discussion of the Strickland
standard, the Court also emphasized that lower courts should remember that the
principles laid out in the opinion must not facilitate the judicial construction of

60. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1169 & n.58 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)
(citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1983)).
61. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
62. Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1169 n.58 (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at 690).
63. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
64. See id.
65. Id. (emphasis added).
66. Id. (emphasis added).
67. Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 7, at 5 (quoting Schofield
v. Holsey, 642 S.E.2d 56, 60 n.1 (Ga. 2007); State v. Gondor, 860 N.E.2d 77, 90 (Ohio 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Exparte Aguilar, No. AP-75526, 2007 WL 3208751, at
*3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ("[Strickland's] discussion of the prejudice prong, however, is replete
with the use of the plural tense, referring to counsel's alleged 'errors' and thus indicating a
cumulative, not individual, consideration of such errors.").
68. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (outlining the two-pronged test using the plural
tense).
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"mechanical rules." 69 Rather, courts reviewing ineffective counsel claims must
"consider the totality of the evidence" that was presented to the factfinder.70
Merely dissecting and distinguishing each individual deficiency, as well as the
prejudicial effect of each individual deficiency, contravenes the fundamental
focus on considering whether the proceeding as a whole was just and reliable.
Indeed, the Court stressed that the "ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the
fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged." 72
Thus, the Court's "rejection of formalistic rules" accompanying individualized
reviews signals the Court's acceptance of a cumulative analysis of multiple
claims of ineffective assistance.73
B. Supreme CourtPrecedentApproves of Cumulative Analysis
Additionally, other Supreme Court precedent further demonstrates that
courts should review ineffective counsel claims cumulatively.74 As early as
1935, the Court approved of cumulative analysis for certain trial errorsspecifically, in the context of reviewing claims of prosecutorial misconduct. In
Berger v. United States,76 the Court reversed and remanded for a new trial after
holding that a prosecutor's misconduct was not "slight or confined to a single
instance," but was, in fact, "pronounced and persistent, with a probable
cumulative effect upon the jury which cannot be disregarded as
inconsequential."
As Blume and Seeds argue, the various suggestions of the Court accepting
cumulative prejudice reviews for ineffective counsel claims began with United
States v. Bagley, which was decided in the Term immediately following the
Strickland decision. In Bagley, the Court adopted the Strickland prejudice test
for appeals previously controlled under Brady v. Marylando-regardingthe

69. Moyer, supra note 56, at 484 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
70. Strickland,466 U.S. at 695 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71. See id. at 686.
72. Id. at 696; see also Moyer, supra note 56, at 484 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696)
(pointing to the Court's passage to support cumulative error analysis).
73. Moyer, supra note 56, at 485.
74. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1171.
75. See Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, supra note 7, at 13 (citing Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935)).
76. 295 U.S. 78.
77. Id. at 89.
78. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
79. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1167, 1169 (quoting and citing Bagley, 473 U.S.at
681 & n.12, 682-83; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); United States v.
Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 (1982)).
80. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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materiality of evidence suppressed by the prosecution.8 1
Mirroring the
Strickland prejudice prong, the Court held that evidence withheld from the
defense by the prosecution is "material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." 83
Ten years later, a majority of the Court mandated a cumulative review of
multiple Bagley materiality claims. 84 In Kyles v. hitley,8 5 the Court ruled that
the Fifth Circuit erred in analyzing materiality by focusing individually on
separate pieces of suppressed evidence. 86 The Court unequivocally emphasized
to lower courts that pieces of suppressed evidence must be "considered
collectively, not item-by-item."
Accordingly, the majority in Kyles reversed
the appellant's conviction and held that the "net effect" of suppressed evidence
undermined confidence in the reliability of the jury's verdict. 88 Given that
Strickland and Bagley are inextricably linked by their prejudice tests, 89 the
Court's position in Kyles demonstrates that it would also likely approve of
cumulative prejudice analysis in ineffective counsel claims. 90
The most recent Supreme Court cases on Strickland ineffective counsel
appeals also indicate the Court's approval of cumulative prejudice analysis. 91 In
Williams v. Taylor,92 the Court set aside the death penalty for a defendant

81. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682-83; Brady, 373 U.S. at 83; see also Blume & Seeds, supra
note 25, at 1161, 1167 (quoting and citing Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681 & n.12, 682-83; Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694; United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 874 (1982)) (noting that Brady
"established 'materiality' as an element of the constitutional error for [prosecutorial suppression of
evidence], but did not define it.").
82. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
83. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
84. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1168 (quoting and citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 421 22, 437 (1995)).
85. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
86. Id. at 422 (quoting and citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 785 (1987); Kyles v.
Whitley, 5 F.3d 806 (1993), rev'd, 514 U.S. 419 (1995)).
87. Id. at 436 &n.10.
88. Id. at 437, 453.
89. Compare Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) ("The defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome."), with Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 ("The evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."). Additionally, the Strickland Court equated
the test for prejudice resulting from ineffective counsel with the test for prejudice resulting from
undisclosed evidence, explaining that the "appropriate test for prejudice finds its roots in the test for
materiality of exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense by the prosecution." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 112-13 (1976)).
90. Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1169.
91. Id. at 1169 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683).
92. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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convicted of capital murder and robbery.93
During state habeas corpus
proceedings, the trial judge found that the defendant's counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing
hearing. 94
This mitigating evidence included the defendant's juvenile
commitment for child abuse, testimony that the defendant was borderline
mentally retarded and suffered from head injuries, and testimony that the
defendant would not pose a threat to society if kept in a structured
environment. 95
The trial judge recommended a sentencing rehearing,
determining that counsel's failure to present these pieces of mitigating evidence
was certainly below the acceptable professional standards under Strickland.96
After the Virginia Supreme Court denied the recommendation for
rehearing,97 the defendant applied for federal habeas corpus relief;98 his case was
eventually appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 99 In its reversal of the
defendant's death sentence, the Court looked to the cumulative effect of
counsel's failure to present each of multiple pieces of mitigating evidence:
In our judgment, the state trial judge was correct both in his
recognition of the established legal standard for determining counsel's
effectiveness, and in his conclusion that the entire postconviction
record, viewed as a whole and cumulative of mitigation evidence
presentedoriginally,raised a reasonable probability that the result of the
sentencing proceeding would have been different if competent counsel
had presented and explained the significance of all the available
evidence.100
Additionally, Wiggins v. Smith 01 also suggests that cumulative analysis is
appropriate for ineffective counsel reviews. 10 In Wiggins, the Court reversed
the defendant's death sentence for first degree murder, robbery, and theft. 103
Similar to the defendant in Williams,104 the defendant in Wiggins claimed, in
post-conviction relief proceedings, that his counsel was ineffective under
Strickland for failing to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing.105

93. See id. at 368, 399.
94. Id. at 370-71.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 371.
97. Id. (citing Williams v. Warden of Mecklenburg Corr. Ctr., 487 S.E.2d 194, 200 (Va.
1997)).
98. Id. at 372 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).
99. Id. at 374 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 526 U.S. 1050 (1999)).
100. Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
101. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
102. See id. at 534-38.
103. Id. at 515, 519.
104. Williams, 529 U.S. at 371.
105. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 516.
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The defendant specifically brought up his gravely troubled childhood, during
which he suffered physical and sexual abuse from his mother and lived in
abusive environments at multiple foster homes. 106
After a fight in the state and federal appellate courts over whether it was
appropriate trial strategy for defense counsel to concentrate on the defendant's
acceptance of responsibility for his crime-instead of resenting the mitigating
evidence1 0 7 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court assessed
Strickland prejudice by weighing the aggravating evidence "against the totality
of available mitigating evidence."1 09 In reversing the defendant's sentence, the
Court reasoned that counsel's failure to investigate the mitigating evidence
resulted from counsel's inattentiveness. 110 Calling the mitigating evidence
"powerful,"" the Court concluded that, if "taken as a whole," it might have
changed the way the jury viewed the defendant in terms of culpability for his
crimes.112 Thus, the relevant language in Williams and Wiggins "simply
clariflied] what the Supreme Court's language in Strickland already suggest[ed]"
regarding the Court's approval of cumulative prejudice analysis in ineffective
counsel appeals.113
V.

THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

In South Carolina, the issue of whether cumulative prejudice analysis applies
to multiple Strickland claims of ineffective counsel in PCR appeals remains an
unsettled question.114 The South Carolina Supreme Court and South Carolina
Court of Appeals have both mentioned cumulative prejudice analysis on several
occasions, however, and some circuit court judges have-in PCR casesrecognized the analysis in granting relief for ineffective counsel before being
reversed by either the South Carolina Court of Appeals or the South Carolina
Supreme Court.
Prior to acknowledging the possibility of a cumulative prejudice analysis in
Strickland ineffective assistance claims, South Carolina appellate courts

106. Id. at 516-17.
107. Id. at 518-19 (citing MD. CODE ANN., ART. 41, § 4-609(d) (Supp. 1989); Wiggins v.
Corcoran, 288 F.3d 629, 639-41 (4th Cir. 2002); Wiggins v. Corcoran, 164 F. Supp. 2d 538, 557
58 (D. Md. 2001); Wiggins v. State, 724 A.2d 1 (Md. 1999)).
108. Id. at 519 (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 537 U.S. 1027 (2002)).
109. Id. at 534 (emphasis added) (citing Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
110. Id. at 526, 538.
111. Id. at 534.
112. Id. at 538 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 539 U.S. 362, 398 (2000)).
113. Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1170 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 538).
114. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; see also Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 535,
657 S.E.2d 771, 779 (2008) (holding that the PCR judge incorrectly found prejudice through
cumulative effect of multiple alleged counsel errors).
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recognized the analysis in reviewing other aspects of trial error.116 In State v.
Peterson,1 1 for example, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the death
sentences of two codefendant accomplices convicted of murder, armed robbery,
grand larceny of a motor vehicle, and conspiracy under a cumulative analysis of
errors the trial judge committed."' The codefendants argued that the trial judge
erred in giving multiple erroneous instructions to the jury, as well as failing to
give several necessary instructions.1 9 The supreme court concluded that
"[s]ome, if not all" of the defendants' five assignments of trial court error
regarding jury instructions had merit and that the "collective impact" of these
errors warranted a new trial.120
Additionally, the South Carolina Court of Appeals has utilized cumulative
analysis with respect to multiple nonprejudicial trial court errors.121 In State v.
Freeman,122 the court of appeals set aside two codefendants' convictions for
marijuana offenses due to the trial judge's conduct during cross-examination.1 23
Among other assertions of error, the defendants argued that the trial judge
committed fourteen different errors during the proceeding, including
unnecessary interruptions, inappropriate comments, and limitations on crossexamination of the State's investigating authorities.124 Although the court found
no prejudice from each of these errors individually, it recognized that the
"aggregation of errors may produce a cumulative effect of prejudice, where
individually, the prejudice is insufficient to require reversal." 25 The court
reasoned that the "combined effect" of the trial judge's otherwise nonprejudicial
errors was enough to prejudice the codefendants' case.126

116. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 287 S.C. 244, 246, 335 S.E.2d 800, 801 (1985) ("The
combination of numerous errors committed by the trial court in this death penalty case compels us
to reverse and remand for a new trial."), overruled on other gounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C.
45, 69-70, 406 S.E.2d 315, 328 29 (1991) ("To the extent they require infavorem vitae review, the
following cases inter alia, are hereby overruled."); State v. Freeman, 319 S.C. 110, 123-24, 459
S.E.2d 867, 875 (Ct. App. 1995) ("[T]he aggregation of errors may produce a cumulative effect of
prejudice, where individually, the prejudice is insufficient to justify reversal.").
117. 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E.2d 800.
118. Id. at 245-46, 335 S.E.2d at 801 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-25 (2003)).
119. Id. The alleged trial court errors included:
(1) [F]ailing to give a limiting instruction regarding the use of his prior convictions ....
(2) giving the jury an erroneous conspiracy charge; (3) giving the jury an erroneous
malice charge; (4) failing to instruct the jury to determine each appellant's individual
culpability before imposing the death penalty, and (5) failing to instruct the jury to
disregard the possibility of parole.
Id.
120. Id.
121. See Freeman, 319 S.C. at 123-24, 459 S.E.2d at 875.
122. 319 S.C 110, 459 S.E.2d 867.
123. Id. at 113, 123 24, 459 S.E.2d at 867, 875.
124. Id. at 123, 459 S.E.2d at 875.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court first touched upon the possibility of
cumulative prejudice analysis for multiple ineffective counsel claims in Green v.
State.127 The defendant in Green was convicted of armed robbery in a jury
triall2 and claimed three core instances of ineffective trial counsel through PCR:
failure to move for a mistrial, failure to object to an Allen jury charge,129 and
failure to request that the trial court poll the jury.130 After disposing of each
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel-concluding that trial counsel was not
ineffective and that the defendant did not suffer prejudice from any claim 31-the
court affirmed the denial of PCR.132 In the context of cumulative analysis, the
court declared that, even if it were inclined to apply the analysis, "[m]ultiple
errors [did] not exist in this case to form any cumulative prejudicial effect."1 33
Although faced with another opportunity to utilize cumulative analysis a
year later, the South Carolina Supreme Court took a different path in assessing
ineffective assistance of counsel in Nance v. Frederick.134
In Nance v.
Frederick,the defendant was sentenced to death after a jury convicted him of
murder, first degree criminal sexual conduct, first degree burglary, assault and
battery with intent to kill, and armed robbery. 13 After the defendant exhausted
his direct state appeals and the PCR court denied him relief on numerous claims
of ineffective counsel,136 the supreme court reversed and remanded for a new
trial, applying the Cronic per se prejudice analysis.137 Instead of analyzing each
claim of ineffective counsel under Strickland, the supreme court utilized its 1984
companion and concluded that counsel's performance was so egregious that his
"trial presentation, in its entirety, represent[ed] a classic Cronic ineffectiveness
case . . . because there was a total breakdown in the adversarial process during

both the guilt phase and penalty phase of [the defendant's] trial."1 38
reversal, the court cited six instances of deficient counsel:

In its

127. 351 S.C. 184, 197, 569 S.E.2d 318, 324 (2002).
128. Id. at 188, 569 S.E.2d at 320.
129. See generally Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02 (1896) (holding that judges
may provide instruction to jurors in the minority that encourages the reconsideration of their vote to
avoid hung juries). South Carolina requires Allen instructions to be "even-handed, directing both
the majority and the minority to consider the other's views." Green, 351 S.C. at 194, 569 S.E.2d at
323.
130. Green, 319 S.C. at 192 95, 569 S.E.2d at 322-24 (citations omitted).
131. See id. at 192 96, 569 S.E.2d at 322 24 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 198, 569 S.E.2d at 325.
133. Id.
134. 358 S.C. 480, 490 596 S.E.2d 62, 67 (2004), vacated and remanded by Ozmint v. Nance,
543 U.S. 1043, 1043 (2005).
135. Id. at 483, 596 S.E.2d at 63.
136. Id. (citing State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501, 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996)).
137. See id. at 490, 596 S.E.3d at 67 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57
(1984)).
138. Id. at 488, 596 S.E.2d at 66 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59).
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(1) [C]ounsel was taking several prescription medications during the
trial which resulted in impaired memory, lack of sleep, and sedation; (2)
counsel provided Nance's expert witness with Nance's medical records
just a few hours before the trial; (3) during his opening statement
counsel informed the jury that he was appointed as a public defender
and did not ask for the case; (4) counsel called a correctional officer as a
witness who testified regarding Nance's only incident of misbehavior in
jail; (5) counsel called Nance's sister to testify without preparing her to
testify and eliciting testimony that Nance was an abnormal child who,
among other things, killed the family's pets; and (6) counsel referred to
Nance during closing arguments as a "sick man" who did "sick
things."1 39
Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded
for reconsideration in light of its decision in Florida v. Nixon.140 In Nixon, the
Court held that Cronic prejudice analysis is reserved for rare circumstances in
which defense counsel failed to engage in the adversarial process.141 On remand,
the South Carolina Supreme Court reproduced its opinion in Nance v. Ozmint,142
reaffirming its position in the Nance v. Frederick case.143 The court concluded
that defense counsel's performance was too "consistently inept" to warrant a
Strickland prejudice analysis: counsel's "ineffectiveness [was] so pervasive as to
render a particularized prejudice inquiry unnecessary."1 44 Thus, the South
Carolina Supreme Court remained adamant about evaluating effectiveness under
Cronic when, on remand, it had an open opportunity to apply a cumulative
Strickland prejudice analysis with regard to defense counsel's errors.145
The South Carolina Supreme Court was again presented with an argument in
favor of cumulative prejudice analysis for several nondeficient counsel errors in
Simpson v. Moore.14 In Simpson, the defendant was sentenced to death after he

139. Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 527 n.2, 657 S.E.2d 775 n.2 (2008) (citing Nance v.
Ozmint, 367 S.C. 547, 626 S.E.2d 878 (2006)) (discussing errors made by defense counsel in Nance
v. Ozmint).
140. See Ozmint v. Nance, 543 U.S. 1043, 1043 (2005); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190
(2004) (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59, 662, 666-67) (clarifying the proper use of Cronic
analysis).
141. See Nixon, 543 U.S. at 190 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-59, 662, 666-67).
142. 367 S.C. 547, 626 S.E.2d 878 (2006).
143. See id. at 553-57, 558, 626 S.E.2d at 881-83 (quoting Nance v. Frederick, 358 S.C. at
485-90, 596 S.E.2d at 65-67 (2004)).
144. Id. at 558, 626 S.E.2d at 883 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Nance v.
Frederick at 490, 596 S.E.2d at 67).
145. See generally id. (quoting Nance, at 490, 596 S.E.2d at 67) (using Cronic per se prejudice
analysis to reverse defendant's convictions, instead of evaluating attorney errors under a Strickland
review).
146. 367 S.C. 587, 604, 627 S.E.2d 701, 710 (2006) ("The record simply did not contain
several errors for the judge to cumulatively assess.").
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was convicted for murdering a convenience store clerk during a robbery. 147 Both
the defendant and the State appealed after the PCR judge granted relief on
sentencing but denied relief on guilt. 148 The defendant raised three different
grounds for ineffective assistance: failure to consult a forensic expert, failure to
call an expert witness to discredit a child witness's testimony, and failure to
object to the State's use of preemptory challenges against prospective female
jurors. 149 The supreme court affirmed the PCR court's denial of relief on each
claim, holding that the PCR judge did not err by refusing to conduct a
cumulative analysis because the "record simply did not contain 'several errors'
for the judge to cumulatively assess." 1o Following its reasoning in Green, the
court remained steadfast in its refusal to address the issue of cumulative analysis
in Strickland claims until it is presented with a case involving multiple counsel
deficiencies.
Two years later, the South Carolina Supreme Court revisited cumulative
analysis in Lorenzen v. State,152 in which the PCR judge found cumulative
prejudice resulting from multiple nonprejudicial deficiencies. 153 In Lorenzen,
the defendant was convicted in a jury trial for sexually molesting a young
child. 154 The PCR judge granted relief after ruling that the defendant's public
defender provided inadequate assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 155
The PCR judge cited five instances of deficient performance chiefly attributable
to counsel's inexperience, all of which were exacerbated by the limited resources
of the public defender's office. 156 The PCR judge then explicitly endorsed
cumulative analysis by ruling that, while none of the young public defender's

147. Id. at 594, 627 S.E.2d at 705.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 594 95, 627 S.E.2d at 705.
150. Id. at 604, 627 S.E.2d at 710.
151. See id. (citing Green v. State, 351 S.C. 184, 196-97, 569 S.E.2d 318, 324-25 (2002)); see
also Green, 351 S.C. at 197, 569 S.E.2d at 325 ("[W]e recognize the threshold to asking the
cumulative prejudicial question is to first find multiple errors.").
152. 376 S.C. 521, 657 S.E.2d 771 (2008).
153. See id.at 527, 657 S.E.2d at 775.
154. Id. at 525, 657 S.E.2d at 774. The defendant was convicted of first degree criminal
sexual conduct with a minor, second degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, and performing a
lewd act upon a child. Id.
155. Id. at 526 28, 657 S.E.2d at 774-75 (citing Nance v. Frederick, 358 S.C. 480, 596 S.E.2d
62 (2004)).
156. Id. at 526 27, 657 S.E.2d at 774-75. The PCR judge found that defense counsel was
deficient by failing to do the following:
(1) [R]etain or even consult with an expert witness; (2) conduct an investigation to
determine whether another individual, particularly the victim's father who was listed on
the sexual offender registry, could have been responsible for sexually abusing the victim;
(3) have [the defendant] submit to a polygraph examination in order to assist in the
defense; (4) obtain the minor victim's records from the sexual abuse counselor, the
Department of Juvenile Justice, and the Department of Social Services; and (5) meet with
the minor child prior to trial.
Id. at 527, 657 S.E.2d at 775.
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failures would individually constitute grounds for relief, "the cumulative neglect
[was] severe."
After the State appealed, the supreme court reversed the PCR
judge's order by concluding that defense counsel was not deficient on any of the
five allegations of ineffective counsel.
Thus, the court held that the PCR
judge erred in relying on Nance v. Frederick to find that the cumulative
prejudicial effect of the purported deficiencies satisfied the Strickland standard
for ineffective counsel.
The court noted, however, that the appropriateness of
cumulative prejudice analysis remained an open question in South Carolina
because the facts of Lorenzen did not provide an opportunity to rule on the
*160
issue.

The most recent mention of cumulative analysis-and seemingly the most
convincing grounds for its adoption-came from the South Carolina Court of
Appeals in Walker v. State.161 In Walker, the defendant was convicted in a jury
trial of first degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnapping. 162 The PCR judpe
granted the defendant relief for ineffective counsel on two separate grounds.
First, the PCR judge determined that defense counsel's failure to investigate the
defendant's girlfriend as an alibi witness was deficient and prejudiced the
defendant.164 Second, the PCR judge cited three additional instances of deficient
performance, including counsel's "failure to investigate [the victim's] alcohol
use, her failure to move to continue the hearing to await the written results of the
forensic testing, [and] her failure to cross-examine the witnesses as to the
discrepancy of the conflicting times of the incident."1 65 The PCR judge
concluded that, when considered along with the failure to investigate the alibi,
these errors "cumulatively prejudiced" the defendant even though these
deficiencies were not individually prejudicial.166
On the State's appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals agreed that the
defense counsel's failure to investigate a potential alibi witness was deficient.167
The court, however, ultimately held that the defendant was not prejudiced by this
deficient performance because, upon further review of the PCR hearing, his

157. Id. at 527, 657 S.E.2d at 775 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. at 528 35, 657 S.E.2d at 775-79 (citations omitted).
159. Id. at 535, 657 S.E.2d at 779 (citing Nance v. Frederick, 358 S.C. 480, 596 S.E.2d 62
(2004)).
160. Id. at 535 n.3, 657 S.E.2d at 779 n.3 ("Although we recognize that whether the
cumulation of several errors, 'which by themselves are not prejudicial, would warrant relief is an
unsettled question in South Carolina' we do not believe the facts of this case present an opportunity
to definitively decide this question.").
161. 397 S.C. 226, 723 S.E.2d 610 (Ct. App. 2012).
162. Id. at 231, 723 S.E.2d at 613.
163. Id. at 234, 723 S.E.2d at 614.
164. Id.
165. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
167. Id. at 235, 723 S.E.2d at 615.
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girlfriend did not qualify as an alibi witness. 168 With regard to the other three
instances of counsel error, the court confirmed that counsel's failure to crossexamine the witnesses as to conflicting evidence on the time of the incident was
deficient performance but not prejudicial; 169 the court disposed of the other two
errors for lack of deficient performance. 170
Notably, the court in Walker had ample opportunity to apply cumulative
prejudice analysis as it faced multiple deficiencies under the first prong of the
Strickland test -counsel's failure to investigate a potential alibi witness and
failure to cross-examine witnesses on conflicting evidence.172 The court of
appeals could have utilized the signal from the South Carolina Supreme Court in
both Greenl73 and Simpsonl74 to recognize that it was, in fact, considering
multiple attorney errors to which it could apply cumulative prejudice analysis.
Nevertheless, the court ruled that cumulative analysis was inappropriate in
Walker because the two deficiencies were "unrelated to each other" and "neither
one [made] the other more prejudicial."l76 Cumulative prejudice analysis,
however, does not focus on a defined interrelationship between or pattern among
deficiencies, but instead considers the overall prejudicial effect when, in the
absence of such counsel errors, "the factfinder would have had a reasonable

168. Id. at 237, 723 S.E.2d at 616 (citing Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 498, 458 S.E.2d 538,
539, 540 (1995)). The South Carolina Court of Appeals supported its reasoning by referencing the
South Carolina Supreme Court's directive that "[t]o qualify as an alibi, a witness's testimony must
account for the defendant's whereabouts during the time of the crime such that it would have been
physically impossible for the defendant to commit the crime." Id. at 237, 723 S.E.2d at 616 (citing
Glover, 318 S.C. at 498, 458 S.E.2d at 540). The purported alibi witness in Walker testified that the
defendant had stayed over at her house during the weekend of the crime, but because the PCR
hearing was five years after the incident, she could not remember whether he was definitely present
at the exact time of the crime. See id. at 233, 238, 723 S.E.2d at 614, 616. Using Glover, the court
of appeals ruled that she did not qualify as an alibi because her testimony "leaves open the
possibility that [the defendant] is guilty." Id. at 238-39, 723 S.E.2d at 617 (citing Glover, 318 S.C.
at 500-01, 458 S.E.2d at 541).
169. Id. at 239, 723 S.E.2d at 617. The conflicting evidence ranged widely, from video
surveillance placing the victim at the scene of the abduction at 3:30 P.M. to several reports that she
was present at the scene at either 7:00 P.M. or 8:00 P.M. See id. at 242, 723 S.E.2d at 619. The court
of appeals simply adopted the PCR judge's findings on the lack of prejudicial effect from counsel's
failure to cross-examine the victim on these discrepancies without employing any further review.
See id. at 243, 723 S.E.2d at 619.
170. Id. at 243, 723 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Edwards v. State 392 S.C. 449, 459, 710 S.E.2d 60,
66 (2011)). These errors included counsel's failure to request a continuance to await DNA test
results and failure to cross-examine the victim on her alcohol abuse. Id. at 239-41, 723 S.E.2d at
617-18.
171. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
172. See supra notes 167, 169 and accompanying text.
173. See Green v. State, 351 S.C. 184, 197, 569 S.E.2d 318, 325 (2002) ("[W]e recognize the
threshold to asking the cumulative prejudicial question is to first find multiple errors. Multiple
errors do not exist in this case to form any cumulative prejudicial effect.").
174. See Simpson v. Moore, 367 S.C. 587, 604, 627 S.E.2d 701, 710 (2006) ("The record
simply did not contain 'several errors' for the judge to cumulatively assess.").
175. See id. at 604, 627 S.E.2d at710; Green, 351 S.C. at 197, 569 S.E.2d at 325.
176. Walker v. State, 397 S.C. 226, 243, 723 S.E.2d 610, 619 (Ct. App. 2012).
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doubt respecting guilt."1
In Walker, the jury arguably could have confronted
reasonable doubt during the trial if defense counsel had presented testimony
from the defendant's girlfriend as to his whereabouts during the crime, in
addition to calling witnesses concerning discrepancies as to the time of the
incident. 18
Most importantly, the Walker court's reluctance to employ cumulative
prejudice analysis, as well as its use of an individual approach to each counsel
error, allows for potentially inconsistent Strickland reviews in the form of
differing claim definitions.179 PCR applicants can frame claims of ineffective
counsel either generally or specifically.180 Even so, courts may review these
claims of attorney errors under certain categories regardless of how they are
pleaded."' Thus, inconsistencies occur with an individualized approach to
Strickland claims because any given categorization of attorney error is almost
always "arbitrary."82 For example, one court may review counsel's general
failure to interview several witnesses in one distinct claim definition category,
while another may review each specific failure to interview every witness as a
separate claim. 18 3 While each of these courses may be logical, the classifications
could have perhaps led to different outcomes concerning the fairness of the
proceeding had the court in the latter specific claim scenario declined to apply
the cumulative analysis that automatically accompanied the review of the former
general claim.184 Therefore, the varied pleading of defense counsel's errors, as
well as the ways in which courts ultimately consider these errors, could
potentially have an unfair effect on prejudice analysis for PCR applicants who
receive the higher burden accompanying an individualized review. 185
The claim definition problem is distinctly illustrated by Walker, in which the
defendant framed one claim of ineffective counsel as the failure to investigate his
girlfriend as a potential alibi witness. 186 If the defendant had chosen to plead this
claim simply as the failure to investigate and call witnesses, the court may not

177. Ex parte Aguilar, No. AP-75526, 2007 WL 3208751, at *16 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 31
2007) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 695 (1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
178. See Walker, 397 S.C. at 233-34, 723 S.E.2d at 614 (noting that the PCR court found that
"[t]he jury would have weighed the credibility of the testimony of the [defendant's girlfriend], and it
is reasonable to assume that the outcome of the deliberations may have been different had this
witness testified in light of the facts of this case") (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. See id. at 243, 723 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Edwards v. State 392 S.C. 449, 459, 710
S.E.2d 60, 66 (2011)); Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1171 72.
180. Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1171 72 & n.71 (quoting Anne M. Voigts, Note,
Narrowing the Eye of the Needle: ProceduralDefault, Habeas Reform, and Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 99 COLuM. L. REV. 1103, 1121-22 (1999)).
181. See id.at 1171 72.
182. Id. at 1171.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 1171-72.
185. See id. at 1172.
186. See Walker v. State, 397 S.C. 226, 231, 723 S.E.2d 610, 613 (Ct. App. 2012).
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have been inclined to analyze the legal definition of, and requirements for, an
alibi witness and individually dispose of the claim for lack of prejudice.1 8 7 In
fact, this particular error could have been reviewed together with counsel's other
"failure to call witnesses" regarding the conflicting times of the incident; in this
scenario, the collective prejudicial effect from this category would have been
automatically gauged upon review.
Indeed, the categorization of these two
claims of ineffective counsel as the failure to call witnesses could have
effectively given the defendant a cumulative analysis, regardless of whether that
was the intention of either the PCR judge or the defendant.189 Thus, an open
recognition of cumulative prejudice analysis would not only be a welcome
solution to the claim definition problem, but would also constitute a vital
safeguard ensuring that all PCR applicants receive consistent reviews of the
prejudicial effect of multiple similar claims of counsel error, regardless of how
they plead them. 190
In early 2014, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the South
Carolina Court of Appeals in Walker v. State, upholding the ruling of the PCR
court that the failure to interview the potential alibi witness was deficient and
prejudiced the defendant.192 The supreme court concluded that the court of
appeals "read Glover too broadly to apply to the alibi testimony . .. and also
failed to adhere to the limited standard of review which appellate courts have
over findings of the PCR court."l93 Because the supreme court determined that
its resolution of the alibi was dispositive, the court did not address the
defendant's argument for cumulative prejudicial analysis of the other alleged
deficiencies.194 Thus, the question regarding whether cumulative prejudicial
analysis is appropriate for multiple claims of ineffective counsel still remains
open in South Carolina.
VI.

THE NEED FOR CUMULATIVE ANALYSIS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

The adoption of cumulative prejudice analysis in Strickland reviews by
South Carolina courts will level the playing field and produce more consistent

187. See id. at 243, 723 S.E.2d at 619 (quoting Edwards v. State 392 S.C. 449, 459, 710
S.E.2d 60, 66 (2011)). The PCR court suggested that the defendant's girlfriend did not technically
meet the legal definition of an alibi witness at the PCR hearing but found that even though "[her]
memory of specific dates is not perfect since it has been approximately five years since the incident,
and approximately four years since the trial, her testimony corroborated that of [the defendant]." Id.
at 233 34, 723 S.E.2d at 614 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. See id. at 242-43, 723 S.E.2d at 618-19 (quoting Edwards, 392 S.C. at 459, 710 S.E.2d
at 66) (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. See id. at 242-43, 723 S.E.2d at 618-19 (quoting Edwards, 392 S.C. at 459, 710 S.E.2d at
66).
190. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
191. Op. No. 27368, 2014 WL 1052609, at *1 (S.C. Mar. 19, 2014).
192. Id. at *4.
193. Id. at *2.
194. Id. at *4 n.1.
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reviews of ineffective counsel claims for the already overburdened PCR
applicants.1 95 Strickland provides an almost "insurmountable test"1 96 for
criminal defendants attempting to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. 197 The
odds are against challenges for ineffective counsel primarily because of the U.S.
Supreme Court's firm directive that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential" to the professional soundness of defense counsel's
conduct at trial. 198 Indeed, to prevail under Strickland, criminal defendants must
overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." 1 99
The strong presumption of effective counsel could not be further from reality
when it comes to the representation of indigent defendants at trial.20 Around the
country, and especially in South Carolina, public defenders' offices are grossly
underfunded and oversaturated with cases 20 to the critical point that they cannot
possibl provide constitutionally adequate representation for all of their indigent
clients.
Given that appointed counsel will likely make errors in any given case
due to the constraints on time and resources,203 PCR courts should be able to

195. See Blume & Seeds, supra note 25, at 1171-72; see also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10
through -160 (2014) (providing the statutory framework for South Carolina PCR); John H. Blume &
Emily C. Paavola, A Reintroduction:Survival Skills for Post-ConvictionPractice in South Carolina,
4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 223 (2010) (providing a survey of the many hurdles facing PCR applicants
in South Carolina); John H. Blume, An Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies, Practice and
Procedurein South Carolina,45 S.C. L. REV. 235 (1994) (discussing PCR procedure and remedies
in South Carolina).
196. Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based
Standardfor EvaluatingIneffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 414-15 (1988).
197. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Strickland test is
often criticized by legal commentators as being the "foggy mirror" test, under which "[if] you place
a mirror in front of defense counsel during trial and it fogs, counsel is in fact effective." JOSHUA
DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATING CRIME 1010- 11
(4th ed. 2010) (quoting RANDALL COYNE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS,

TEACHER'S MANUAL 148 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Giving credence to this
criticism, a survey of over 37,000 cases that included challenges to convictions for ineffective
assistance of counsel shows that lower courts applying Strickland have found that almost all
defendants (97%) have received constitutionally adequate representation. See id. at 1015.
198. Strickland,466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 708 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a
person of means, by selecting a lawyer and paying him enough to ensure he prepares thoroughly,
usually can obtain better representation than that available to an indigent defendant, who must rely
on appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited time and resources to devote to a given case.").
201. See Meg Kinnard, Cases Flood S.C.'s Public Defender System, THE STATE, Apr. 18,
2011, at A12.
202. See Calhoun, supra note 196, at 416-17 ("[T]he problem of inadequate criminal
representation is much more pervasive than the Strickland Court seemed to realize-or was
prepared to admit.").
203. See id. at 416 (stating that Judge David L. Bazelon admitted: "[W]hat I have seen in 23
years on the bench leads me to believe that a great many if not most indigent defendants do not
receive the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed them by the 6th Amendment." (quoting
David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1973))) (internal
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assess the cumulative prejudicial effect of these multiple errors on the
applicant's case.
Indigent defendants are similarly burdened at the PCR level: they must fill
out PCR applications on their own, and they often have no training on how to
properly frame the grounds for ineffective counsel.204 In fact, under current
South Carolina law, indigent defendants do not even receive the assistance of
appointed counsel until the PCR application is filed by the defendant and a
return is submitted by an attorney in the PCR section of the South Carolina
Office of the Attorney General.205 Thus, under the grounds for relief in section
10 of the PCR application, it is entirely up to the untrained applicant to name the
ineffective counsel claims.206 Even when attorneys are appointed by the court,
they too are often inexperienced in PCR matters and conceivably will not be
helpful in assisting with the proper framing of ineffective counsel claims.207
Moreover, applicants and their appointed attorneys will not likely be cognizant
of how to group similar claims into categories in an attempt to receive any sort
of cumulative prejudice analysis.208 Again, a formally recognized cumulative
prejudice review could be a valuable protective device ensuring that, no matter
how untrained applicants or appointed attorneys plead multiple claims of
ineffective assistance, the manner of pleading will not produce inconsistent
results or have a detrimental effect on the review of prejudice. 209
Furthermore, consistent prejudice reviews are clearly needed in South
Carolina: despite its importance, PCR receives scant attention from scholars and
the legal community. 21 Nevertheless, for most criminal defendants challenging
convictions that resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, PCR is the most

quotation marks omitted). Judge Bazelon served as Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. Bazelon, supra, at 1.
204. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1; see also Richardson v. State, 377 S.C. 103, 106, 659 S.E.2d
493, 495 (2008) ("Many times, such as in the case at hand, an applicant does not understand the
PCR process, including the fact that the allegations that can be raised are limited by law.").
205. See S.C. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2008-10-06-01 (Oct. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.secourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfmVorderNo=2008-10-06-01; see also S.C. R.
Civ. P. 71.1 ("If, after the State has filed its return, the application presents questions of law or fact
which will require a hearing, the court shall promptly appoint counsel to assist the applicant if he is
indigent."); Demetrio L. Sears, South CarolinaPost-Conviction Relief: Practical Considerations
and Proceduresfrom a Prisoner's Perspective, 64 S.C. L. REv. 1169, 1185-86 (2013) ("This
appointment, however, is not automatic upon the filing of a PCR action by a prisoner.").
206. S.C. R. Civ. P., Form 5.
207. See Blume, supra note 195, at 236 & n.3 ("[A]n established post-conviction bar does not
exist in South Carolina. Thus, it is usually 'amateur hour' for the inmate, while attorneys who
specialize in post-conviction work represent the state.").
208. See id. For an examination of the ineffective counsel claim definition and the role of
cumulative prejudice review, see supra Part V.
209. See supra Part V.
210. See Blume, supra note 195, at 236 (discussing how PCR is often referred to as the
"redheaded stepchild of the legal system" (quoting Vance L. Cowden, Indigent Defense Servicesfor
Post-Conviction Relief in South Carolina: Current Problems and Potential Remedies, 42 S.C. L.
REv. 417, 420 (1991))) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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important venue for obtaining relief.211 Additionally, PCR is the last resort for
remedies in the state system for most criminal defendants; after pursuing PCR,
these defendants must turn to a federal habeas corpus petition. 21 Because the
Fourth Circuit does not currently recognize cumulative prejudice review, South
Carolina's PCR process is an applicant's last chance to receive this analysis in
Strickland claims.2 13 Thus, South Carolina should join Maryland and West
Virginia by becoming the third state in the Fourth Circuit to explicitly give
214
criminal defendants a cumulative prejudice review at the state level.
VII. CONCLUSION
In assessing multiple Strickland claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
courts should consider the cumulative prejudicial effect of multiple attorney
deficiencies. A majority of courts around the nation have reached this
conclusion.215 On numerous occasions, the South Carolina judiciary has come
close to joining that majority.216 The wide-ranging suggestions of support for a
cumulative review from the U.S. Supreme Court, as well as courts around the
country, are further proof of the need for its recognition in South Carolina.217
Due to the persistent problems occurring in individualized Strickland reviews, as
well as the issue of differing claim definitions, cumulative prejudice analysis is
necessary to provide consistent reviews of multiple claims of ineffective counsel
for all PCR applicants. In adopting cumulative review, South Carolina will take
a crucial step forward in its PCR process to ensure that all criminal defendants
receive a fair review of their fundamental constitutional rights to effective
counsel and a just proceeding.
Benjamin Dudek

211. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 195, at 233 ("In PCR, the focus is usually on alleged
errors made by prior counsel and other errors of law or fact that occurred outside the record below.
The South Carolina Supreme Court said that 'when asserting the erroneous admission of evidence, a
violation of a constitutional right, or other errors in a proceeding, the [PCR] applicant generally
must frame the issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel."' (footnotes omitted) (quoting AlShabaaz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 363, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2000))). Blume and Paavola believe that
the South Carolina Supreme Court's statement is "overbroad and underinclusive" because not all
claims for PCR are centered on ineffective counsel claims. Id. (citing Cummings v. State, 274 S.C.
26, 27 28, 260 S.E.2d 187 (1979)).
212. See Blume, supra note 195, at 237 ("[I]n most cases, the state post-conviction process
will be the inmate's last chance to raise any additional challenges to his [or her] conviction or
sentence.") (footnote omitted). According to the "exhaustion doctrine," defendants must exhaust all
state remedies before filing for federal habeas corpus, and petitioners may only argue substantive
issues that were previously raised in the state appeals process. Id. at 237 n.5 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
213. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 52 and 56 and accompanying text.
216. See supra Part V.
217. See supra Parts III IV.
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